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Abstract The question of the extent to which EU institutions can grant powers to EU
decentralised agencies has been the subject of inter-institutional and academic debate
for decades. Only in 2014 did the Court of Justice itself settle the issue, confirming the
constitutionality of ongoing agencification and allowing for its future development.
The present article identifies a number of lessons which the EU legislature should
draw from the Court’s Short-selling ruling. In addition a number of issues which
have not yet been resolved by the Court but which may pose themselves in the future
are identified. These relate to the nature of the discretion afforded to EU agencies, the
nature of the acts which they adopt (in light of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU) and the
new trend of allowing for direct delegations of power between national authorities
and their EU counterparts.
Keywords EU decentralised agencies · Institutional balance · Meroni doctrine ·
Delegation
1 Introduction
Today, the EU decentralised agencies1 constitute a significant part of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) administration, both in terms of resources and in terms of
1Although an official definition is lacking, the EU decentralised agencies may be defined as permanent
bodies under EU public law, established by the institutions through secondary legislation and endowed
with their own legal personality. See Chamon [2], p. 10.
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personnel.2 For a long time the process of qualitative agencification, i.e. the trend of
conferring increasingly significant tasks or powers on agencies,3 proceeded timidly:
since the EU Treaties (and before the EEC and EC Treaties) did not explicitly foresee
or allow the establishment and empowerment of ‘secondary bodies’, the EU legis-
lature moved on legally uncertain ground when it granted powers to a decentralised
agency. This legal uncertainty continued until the 2014 Court ruling in the Short-
selling case,4 when the Court was asked for the very first time to scrutinise a decision
granting powers to an EU agency. Through its judgment in Short-selling, the Court
has offered the political institutions the constitutional framework within which the
EU’s institutional architecture can be developed and executive powers may be granted
to EU agencies. The present contribution provides a sketch of this framework, high-
lighting the key elements which the institutions will have to take into account when
working out new legislation and identifying new contentious issues not addressed by
the Court in Short-selling.
2 Constitutional obstacles to EU agencification
To put it simply, agencification was legally questionable pre-Short-selling in light
of three main issues. Firstly, (pre-Lisbon) Article 4 EEC provided that the “tasks en-
trusted to the Community shall be carried out by the [. . .] institutions” and Article 288
TFEU today still provides that to “exercise the Union’s competences, the institutions
shall adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.” These
provisions could be read as implying that only the institutions, but not other bodies,
can exercise the EU’s competences.5
Linked to this, but self-standing, is the requirement of upholding the institutional
balance: if only the EU institutions can act on behalf of the EU, the decision of
the EU legislature to empower an EU agency necessarily undermines the powers of
another EU institution. However, even if the Treaties (implicitly) allow the establish-
ment and empowerment of subsidiary bodies, it cannot be ruled out that the act of
conferring powers on an agency may still undermine the prerogatives of one of the
institutions. By way of illustration: the scope for establishing an independent Eu-
ropean Cartel Office is limited (or non-existent) since Article 105 TFEU provides
that “the Commission shall ensure the application of the principles laid down in Arti-
cles 101 and 102.” Similarly, establishing an agency competent to hear and determine
questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU would undermine
the prerogatives of the Court of Justice (Court) and the General Court.
Thirdly, assuming there is scope under the Treaties for establishing and empower-
ing EU agencies (without violating the institutional balance), another question still is
which kinds of powers may be conferred on or delegated to EU decentralised agen-
cies. This is a perennial problem of delegation which every legal system is confronted
2For instance, between 2006 and 2016 the subsidies from the EU budget to the EU agencies has more than
tripled.
3Chamon [2], pp. 45–46.
4Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2014:18.
5See Chamon [2], p. 135.
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with, and which was first addressed by the Court in the Meroni case of 1958.6 For
current EU agencification however, the question was whether this ECSC case dealing
with a delegation of powers to private law bodies could be transposed to the EU legal
framework to govern conferrals of power to public law bodies.7
For decades, these issues were a source of contention between both the institutions
and legal scholars but because EU agencification was based on a consensual approach
between the EU institutions and the Member States,8 they never escalated into gen-
uine conflicts. The financial crisis, resulting in a qualitative step in EU agencification,
changed this when the EU legislature decided to grant the European Securities and
Market Authority (ESMA) an exceptional intervention power to regulate the prac-
tice of short-selling. In the legislative process, the UK was the only Member State
in Council to vote against Regulation 236/20129 and subsequently challenged the
Regulation’s validity before the Court, invoking, inter alia, the Meroni doctrine and
the idea of institutional balance (although the latter was not invoked explicitly). The
Court in the end rejected the UK’s action, thereby clarifying for the first time what
the legal scope is for empowering EU decentralised agencies.
3 The Court’s ruling in Short-selling
Since the Court’s decision in Short-selling has been amply commented upon else-
where,10 only the most important elements in the Court’s ruling will be recalled
here.
On the UK’s plea invoking the Meroni doctrine, the Court first confirmed that
a conferral of powers by the EU legislature to an EU agency is indeed governed
by Meroni. Subsequently the Court simplified the original Meroni doctrine by find-
ing that it ‘in essence’ prohibits the delegation (or conferral) of discretionary pow-
ers.11 Applying the doctrine in casu, the Court dismissed the UK’s plea by identi-
fying a number of elements in the legislative framework (laid down by Regulation
236/2012)12 that limit the ESMA’s scope of action to such an extent that its powers
are “precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives
established by [the legislature].”13
In its third plea, the UK had argued that the legislature had violated Articles 290
and 291 TFEU when granting the contested power to the ESMA. The UK’s reasoning
here was not as clear as it could be, albeit for evident reasons: reasoning its argument
through, the UK reproached the Council and Parliament for granting an implementing
6Case 9/56 Meroni, EU:C:1958:7.
7Chamon [4], p. 383.
8Chamon [2], p. 119.
9Regulation 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling
and certain aspects of credit default swaps [2012] OJ L86/1.
10See i.e. Chamon [4]; Kohtamäki [7]; Martucci [9]; Clément/Wilz [5].
11Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2014:18, para. 42.
12Ibid., paras 46–51.
13Ibid., para. 53.
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power under Article 291 TFEU to an EU agency, whereas Article 291 TFEU only pro-
vides for the Member States, the Commission or the Council to adopt ‘implementing-
type acts’. More precisely, Article 291 TFEU prescribes recourse to the Commission
or Council when EU law has to be implemented uniformly. In essence, the UK was
arguing that the legislature had violated the institutional balance by impinging on
the Commission’s prerogative to implement EU law under the conditions of Article
291 TFEU. It should be clear however that this would not have advanced the UK’s
case, since that Member State’s actual aim was to reserve the implementation of EU
financial regulation to its own authorities. Put differently, it is not that the UK did not
want an EU agency to implement EU law, it simply did not want any EU authority to
implement EU law.
The Court also dismissed this plea by firstly finding that Articles 290 and 291
TFEU constitute an open framework to which the legislature is not restricted and,14
secondly, by finding that the ESMA’s contested power did not correspond to the pow-
ers envisaged in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.15
Finally, the UK had also argued that if the ESMA’s contested power would result in
binding decisions addressed at individual market operators, the legislature could not
have based its regulation on Article 114 TFEU, since ‘adopting individual measures
addressed at natural or legal persons’ cannot be qualified as ‘harmonisation’. While
the AG found that Article 114 TFEU could indeed not serve as a legal basis,16 the
Court upheld the regulation by recalling its well-established jurisprudence on Article
114 TFEU. A key feature of this jurisprudence is the broad discretion afforded to the
EU legislature in choosing the most appropriate method of harmonisation.
4 Take home message from Short-selling
To a great extent, the Court’s ruling in Short-selling may be read as a drafting manual
for the Commission and legislature when they contemplate granting further powers to
EU agencies.17 Should they wish to grant further (significant) powers to EU agencies,
they would be well-advised to pick up on the reasoning developed by the Court.
4.1 Agencies and Meroni
Thus, any such power should be ‘precisely delineated’ and the Court offers us a
number of elements which contribute to satisfying this condition. Going beyond the
case-specifics of Short-selling, a power will be held to be precisely delineated when
(i) the conferral of powers is exceptional, (ii) the agency’s powers are embedded in
decision-making procedures involving other actors, and (iii) the agency acts pursuant
to pre-defined criteria.18
14Ibid., paras 78–79.
15Ibid., para. 83.
16Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2013:562.
17On the Court’s jurisprudence as a ‘drafting guide’ for the EU legislature, see Weatherill [15].
18Chamon [2], p. 247.
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Granting significant powers to EU agencies should be exceptional, since imple-
menting and/or enforcing EU law is typically a task for the Member States’ admin-
istrations. As a rule, EU agencies should play a supporting role in this process and
if they are empowered to take up primary responsibility in this regard, the EU legis-
lature should take care to properly set out the reasons for this.19 Secondly, the Court
in Short-selling emphasised that the ESMA could not act autonomously but had to
consult other bodies before taking a decision. Remarkably, the Court did not seem
to mind that these consultations were non-binding. The EU legislature might want to
pick up on this when in the future it contemplates a significant conferral of powers to
an EU agency. Prescribing a mandatory consultation in the agency’s decision-making
procedure may shield the conferral of powers from contestation on the grounds of the
Meroni doctrine. Lastly and most importantly, the Court in Short-selling stressed the
fact the ESMA was ‘limited’ in its powers because it had to act on pre-defined cri-
teria laid down both in the legislative regulation and in the Commission’s delegated
acts prescribed by the legislative regulation. Crucially, the Court did not seem to take
issue with the vagueness of these pre-defined criteria, which could actually be read
as proof of the ESMA’s discretionary power. By stressing that pre-defined criteria are
laid down for the agency to act upon, the political institutions may in the future again
shield conferrals of power to EU agencies from contestation, regardless of how vague
these criteria are, i.e. regardless of how much discretion they leave to the agency.
4.2 Agencies and Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
Short-selling clarified that it is possible to grant EU agencies ‘implementing’ pow-
ers without upsetting the Treaty framework on delegated and implementing acts laid
down in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, but it does not immediately clarify how the
EU legislature can choose between granting a power to the Commission or to an
EU agency. This difficult question actually links up with the (equally problematic)
question of how the EU legislature can know whether to grant the Commission a
delegated power (under Article 290 TFEU) or an implementing power (under Article
291 TFEU). Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court has solved the
latter question by finding that the legislature has a discretion in granting an executive
power to the Commission either in the form of an implementing (291) or delegated
(290) power.20
In Short-selling however, the Court does not explicitly find that the legislature has
a discretion in choosing between giving an executive power to the Commission or to
an agency. Instead it branded the ESMA’s power as qualitatively different from the
powers envisaged in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Questionable as this finding may
19Note that in Short-selling the ESMA’s intervention powers were exceptional in the sense that the ESMA
will only be competent when the Member States’ authorities do not take sufficient action to address serious
threats to the stability and integrity of financial markets. In this regard, the Court did not take issue with
the fact that it is up to the ESMA itself to decide whether Member States’ authorities have taken sufficient
action.
20See Case C-427/12 Commission v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2014:170; Case C-88/14 Commission v
Parliament & Council, EU:C:2015:499.
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be,21 the lesson for the EU legislature is to stress the special nature of the powers
which it would want to confer on an EU agency. To put it simply, the implementing
power of the Commission under Article 291 TFEU is a general implementing power,
whereas the implementing powers which may be entrusted to an agency require not
general expertise but a high degree of professional or technical expertise lacking in
the ‘generalist’ European Commission. Presenting an executive power granted to an
EU agency in this way will then shield it from contestation on the basis of Article
291 TFEU.
What about the power under Article 290 TFEU? The Court in Short-selling it-
self does not distinguish between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, and hence both could
be entrusted to EU agencies but it nonetheless seems doubtful that the legislature
could grant an agency the power to amend or supplement formal legislation. Not
so much because EU agencies are less democratically legitimate than the European
Commission,22 as suggested by AG Jääskinen,23 but because the very act of altering
formal legislation would seem to require the intervention of an authority vested in
the Treaties, as Lenaerts notes.24 Lenaerts further argues that delegated acts, since
they are of quasi-legislative nature, would ipso facto require the exercise of discre-
tionary powers and would therefore in any case violate the (Meroni) requirement that
an agency can only exercise precisely delineated powers. However, this seems more
questionable since the discretion afforded to the Commission depends on how the
legislature has defined the mandate. Already today examples exist whereby the Com-
mission is granted a power under Article 290 TFEU without having any discretionary
margin in adopting the required delegated acts.25
Thus proceeding purely on the basis of Short-selling, granting an agency the power
to amend or supplement EU legislation would seem possible but ill-advised. The
power to amend or supplement would have to be precisely delineated and the leg-
islature would have to show that it is not necessary (or that it would even be coun-
terproductive) to empower the Commission under Article 290 TFEU. In any event,
this discussion seems deprived of much practical relevance, now that the Court has
blurred the demarcation line between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (cf. supra). Instead
of arguing why an EU agency ought to be granted the power to supplement formal
legislation, the EU legislature can avoid these difficulties by presenting the power
conferred to an EU agency as a ‘mere’ implementing power, something which the
Court clearly sanctioned in Short-selling.
21Craig finds force in the Court’s reasoning but omits to explain why. See Craig [6], pp. 194–195. In-
stead, as Bertrand notes, it is difficult to see how the ESMA would be adopting anything other than an
implementing act (under Article 291 TFEU). See Bertrand [1], p. 28.
22After all, nothing prevents the EU legislature from setting up an EU agency that is subject to greater
democratic control than the European Commission is.
23Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2013:562, para. 85.
24Lenaerts [8], pp. 762–763.
25See for instance Article 9d of Directive 1999/62 which allows the Commission to adapt, by way of del-
egated acts, Annex 0 of the Directive to the Union acquis and Article 3(2) of the same Directive which
allows the Commission to amend (without referring to a delegated act) the list of national taxes in Ar-
ticle 3(1) when a Member States notifies the Commission of a change in its tax system. See Directive
1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 1999 on the charging of heavy
goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures [1999] OJ L 187/42.
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4.3 Agencies and Article 114 TFEU
Lastly, part of the take home message of Short-selling relates to the use of Article
114 TFEU as a legal basis in agencification. In casu, the UK argued that Article 114
TFEU could not be relied upon to empower an EU agency to adopt individual mea-
sures addressed to private parties. The Court also rejected this plea, thereby further
elaborating its Article 114 TFEU jurisprudence. In cases such as Smoke Flavour-
ings and General Product Safety26 the Court had already sanctioned recourse to the
harmonisation clause to establish a centralised (EU) decision-making procedure and
to adopt both general as well as individual decisions. The question therefore was
whether these individual measures could also be addressed to private parties rather
than Member States (as in General Product Safety) and whether the essential ele-
ments informing the decision-making in the centralised (EU) procedure were laid
down in the formal legislative act (as required under Smoke Flavourings).27 The
Court answered the first question positively28 but did not address the second question
explicitly since this requirement was de facto already covered by the Court’s conclu-
sion that ESMA did not exercise a discretionary power. The take home message for
the legislature is reassuring since the Court several times stressed that the legislature
has discretion in choosing the most appropriate method of approximation and heav-
ily relied on the recitals in the legislative act to perform its scrutiny.29 Short-selling
as the provisional30 culmination of the Court’s jurisprudence on Article 114 TFEU
therefore results in a sound constitutional basis and henceforth preferable legal basis
for future agencification.
5 Current and future issues in agencification
Although Short-selling constitutes an important judicial sanctioning of agencification
it should be clear that it does not solve all legal issues pertaining to the phenomenon.
Three issues will be discussed further: (i) the question of discretion exercised by EU
agencies, (ii) the question of institutional balance and (iii) the question of an upward
delegation (rather than a legislative conferral) of powers to EU agencies.
5.1 Which discretion is prohibited for EU agencies?
Following Short-selling the core of the Meroni doctrine, i.e. the prohibition to grant
discretionary powers, (still) applies to EU agencies. Yet, when precisely a power
should be qualified as ‘discretionary’ and thus non-delegatable or non-conferrable
26See Case C-66/04 UK v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2005:743; Case C-359/92 Germany v Council,
EU:C:1994:306.
27Chamon [4], p. 388.
28Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2014:18, para. 107.
29Ibid., paras 102, 103, 105, 109, 114–115.
30Following Short-selling the Court’s jurisprudence on Article 114 TFEU has of course further developed.
See notably Case C-358/14 Poland v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2016:323.
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to EU agencies, remains unclear. As noted above, the Court’s conclusion in Short-
selling that the ESMA’s power under Article 28 of Regulation 236/2012 was non-
discretionary is very much debatable but should be accepted as the standard for fur-
ther agencification. At first sight, the Court upholding the Meroni doctrine in this
regard sits uneasily or even conflicts with the General Court’s jurisprudence in which
it has recognised a broad discretion on the part of the authorities of the EU, especially
in relation to the assessment of complex scientific and technical facts. The General
Court consistently confirms this jurisprudence also in relation to the EU agencies,
without therefore making any distinction, among the ‘EU authorities’, between EU
institutions and EU secondary bodies.
The discretion as thus recognised by the General Court does not only extend to the
question of which measures ought to be taken but also to the finding of the basic facts
(upon which an authority acts).31 The General Court’s most far-reaching statement
on the nature of this discretion can be found in the Rütgers case in which it noted:
“it must be acknowledged that the ECHA has a broad discretion in a sphere which
entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called
upon to undertake complex assessments. The legality of a measure adopted in that
sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard
to the objective which the legislature is seeking to pursue.”32 So how can this kind of
discretion be reconciled with the prohibition under the Meroni doctrine of granting
discretionary powers to EU agencies?
The answer lies is in the fact that the ECHA’s discretion sanctioned in Rütgers
is something different from the discretionary powers prohibited under Short-selling.
Originally it could be said that both were indeed incompatible, since under the orig-
inal Meroni ruling, powers were only deemed to be executive or non-discretionary
when a body’s decisions were “the result of mere accountancy procedures based on
objective criteria laid down by the [delegating authority].”33 An agency would thus
be relegated to a kind of calculator, mechanically connecting a certain input to output
(a decision).34 In Short-selling however, the Court focused on another finding in the
original Meroni ruling, namely that a discretionary power “may, according to the use
which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy.”
On the scale from ‘mere accountancy procedures’ to ‘the execution of actual eco-
nomic policy’ the Court in Short-selling thus chose to interpret ‘discretionary pow-
ers’ restrictively, allowing an EU agency to exercise the kind of ‘executive discretion’
sanctioned by the General Court in Rütgers, since such a discretion still does not al-
low the agency to develop a policy of its own. After all, it should be noted that the dis-
pute in Rütgers revolved around the question whether anthracene oil (paste) should,
as a substance, be deemed of very high concern such as to warrant its inclusion on
the candidate list of substances for inclusion in Annex XIV of the REACH Regu-
31See e.g. Case T-135/13 Hitachi Chemical Europe e.a. v ECHA, EU:T:2015:253, paras 52–53; Case
T-115/15 Deza v ECHA, EU:T:2017:329, paras 163–164.
32Case T-94/10 Rütgers v ECHA, EU:T:2013:107, para. 133.
33Case 9/56 Meroni, EU:C:1958:7, p. 153.
34Note however that the ESMA’s power to fine as laid down in Regulation 648/2012 is exactly elaborated
in such a way, see Article 65 and Annexes I and II of the Regulation.
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lation.35 The policy of regulating dangerous chemicals and limiting or phasing out
their use has been clearly established by the legislature in the REACH Regulation.
The question of whether a chemical is dangerous is a scientific one for the ECHA
to address and the Court rightly declined to second guess the scientific assessment,
instead emphasising the ECHA’s discretion.
Still, the confusing part in Rütgers is the Court’s reference to the ‘political, eco-
nomic and social choices’ which the ECHA is allegedly entitled to make. The refer-
ence to these choices was superfluous since ECHA only adopts a scientific decision.
This part of the judgment is actually an example of sloppy drafting: the Court simply
copy-pasted the standard provision it uses when it scrutinises acts of the EU legisla-
ture or the Commission, stressing the discretion afforded to the institutions (including
the legislature).36 It thus ignored the fact that EU agencies are not institutions of the
EU, let alone that they have the legitimacy of the formal legislature.
To sum up, the kind of discretion sanctioned by the General Court in cases such
as Rütgers is an executive discretion. It falls somewhere between a purely execu-
tive power (referred to by the Court in the original Meroni ruling) and the discretion
which the Commission may exercise under Article 290 and 291 TFEU. Fitting it in
the larger framework of EU-rulemaking, it is up to the EU legislature to make politi-
cal, economic and social choices and only the legislature can decide on the essential
elements of EU legislation. Next, the Commission can make political, economic and
social choices when it implements, supplements or amends EU legislation while fully
respecting the essential elements and the essential aims37 of that legislation. Finally,
EU agencies can exercise an executive discretion when implementing EU law. In this,
at least the same substantive limits as those applicable to the Commission (under Ar-
ticle 291 TFEU) ought to apply but without the agency being empowered to make
political, economic or social policy choices.
5.2 The question of institutional balance
One of the issues ignored by the Court in the Short-selling case was the repercussions
of its ruling on the institutional balance. After all, the Court effectively ruled that the
legislature can work outside the framework of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, granting
‘executive-type’ powers to bodies (EU agencies) not foreseen in those Articles. This
begs the question of how this affects the prerogatives of the EU institutions that are
mentioned in those Articles. More concretely, it can be argued that the Commission
(or exceptionally the Council) derives a prerogative from Article 291(2) TFEU to
implement EU law when uniform conditions therefor are required. Similarly, it is a
prerogative of the Commission to amend or supplement EU legislation on its non-
essential elements whenever the formal legislature has opted not to do so itself. In
Short-selling the Court seemingly opens up these powers to the EU agencies without
35The substances included in Annex XIV are substances for which an authorisation is required in order to
be used or to be put on the market for use.
36See e.g. Case C-358/14 Poland v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2016:323, para. 79; Case T-100/15 Dextro
Energy v Commission, EU:T:2016:150, para. 30.
37See Case C-65/13 Parliament v Commission, EU:C:2014:2289, para. 43.
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putting checks on the legislature’s choice to forgo the options provided by Articles
290 and 291 TFEU.
In theory it thus has become easier for the legislature to grant executive powers
to EU agencies than to the Commission since granting powers to the Commission is
governed by the (heavy) framework of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU while no similar
such a framework is in place for empowering EU agencies.38 Will the EU legislature
then not ignore the Commission’s prerogatives in the future? In light of the politi-
cal context this would appear to be a rash conclusion. After all, EU agencification
is generally based on a broad inter-institutional consensus,39 where Parliament and
Council will be very mindful of the Commission’ sensitivities. Any new significant
power will also have to be proposed by the Commission which can thus exercise a
form of control over which powers are entrusted to EU agencies. The legislative act,
the legality of which was contested by the UK in Short-selling, is an illustration of
this: the Commission itself originally proposed to grant this power to the ESMA40
and the power is a very specific and exceptional one. While Short-selling does not
exclude the legislature conferring significant executive powers to EU agencies rather
than to the Commission, political reality means that any such powers will only be
granted if there is a consensus between the three political institutions.41
A second question is whether the agencies’ involvement in the drafting of imple-
menting and delegated acts, formally adopted by the Commission, respects the insti-
tutional balance. Indeed, the Commission’s formal powers could de facto be hollowed
out to such an extent that the Commission is divested of its prerogative to adopt imple-
menting and delegated acts. Although the ESAs have the most far-reaching powers in
this regard, which Craig criticises,42 this issue is not restricted to the ESAs. Michel
notes that the Commission’s prerogatives under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU only
cover the adoption of delegated and implementing acts but do not grant an exclusive
right on the drafting of such acts to the Commission. The involvement of agencies
is then possible but the Commission should have complete liberty to alter the drafts
presented to it, which is not the case when the ESAs draft delegated acts for the
Commission.43 Although not so much linked with the issue of institutional balance,
it may further be noted that the procedures prescribed by the ESAs’ establishing acts
for the adoption of implementing acts also deviate from the default rules laid down
in the Comitology regulation.44 If the latter may be qualified as a piece of organic
38See Ohler [11], p. 251; Skowron [13], p. 353.
39See above, fn. 8.
40See COM (2010) 482 final.
41See however ESMA’s power to fine credit rating agencies under Regulation 1060/2009 as amended by
Regulation (EU) 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 [2011] OJ
L 145/30. In its original proposal, the Commission had proposed to grant itself this power following a
recommendation from the agency, but the European Parliament amended this. See Article 36a in COM
(2010) 484 final.
42Craig [6], pp. 195–198.
43Michel [10], pp. 227–236.
44Regulation (EU) 182/ 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 lay-
ing down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers [2011] OJ L 55/13.
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EU law,45 this may put in doubt the legality of the procedures foreseen in the ESAs’
regulations.
5.3 The question of upward delegations
Until the current phase in EU agencification, the powers granted to EU agencies were
entrusted to them by the EU institutions. In this regard, part of the debate has re-
volved around the questions of how these empowerments ought to be qualified: the
EU legislature cannot delegate powers which it does not possess itself (this also flows
from Meroni) and it has thus been argued that the legislature is therefore conferring
powers, whereas only the Commission could delegate executive powers to an EU
agency. Some authors have argued that since the EU agencies’ powers were never
exercised by the Commission in the first place but by the Member States’ administra-
tions, agencification entails neither conferral nor delegation but a ‘Europeanization’
of executive power even if powers are formally granted by EU institutions.46
More recently, the EU legislature has explicitly provided in a number of legislative
acts that national authorities can further delegate powers to EU agencies on a bilateral
basis. This is for instance foreseen in Article 28 of the establishing acts of the ESAs,
even if only in the case of ESMA this option has been used in practice. The frame-
work governing these delegations as set out in Article 28 is however rather limited.
A similar delegation provision may be found in the proposal for a new EASA regula-
tion which provides that the EASA “shall only agree to the transfer of responsibilities
[. . .] when it is satisfied that it can effectively exercise the transferred responsibility
in compliance with this Regulation and the delegated and implementing acts adopted
on the basis thereof.”47 While this adds a further requirement before the agency can
consent to the delegation, it should be clear that this limitation is still incomplete
since it does not refer to compliance with the Treaties.
How should such a transfer be evaluated under Article 291 TFEU? Since it con-
cerns powers of national authorities (Article 291(1) TFEU), the prerogatives of the
Commission need not be concerned unless it is shown that the agency is actually be-
ing asked to implement EU law under uniform conditions. Since the powers would
be transferred by national authorities, the Meroni doctrine would not act as a limit
in line with Spain v. Parliament and Council.48 This would only be different if the
Court in its future jurisprudence gives effect to the objectivised test under Article
291(2) TFEU.49 Pre-Lisbon, the EU legislature’s choice to grant the Commission
with an implementing power (in the strict sense) was facultative (as confirmed early
on in Köster):50 the legislature was free to confer (or not) an implementing power on
45The LIFE case could be read in this way as suggested by Schütze. See Case C-378/00 Commission v
Parliament & Council, EU:C:2003:42; Schütze [12], p. 678.
46See Van Cleynenbreugel [14], pp. 81–82. Also before Van Cleynenbreugel, other authors have argued
that the delegations to EU agencies may (or should) be conceptualised as a Europeanization of executive
powers upwards from the national level. For a discussion, see Chamon [2], pp. 195–196.
47See Article 53(3) of the regulation proposed by COM (2015) 613 final.
48Case C-146/13 Spain v Parliament & Council, EU:C:2015:298, para. 87.
49On this objectification, see Chamon [3], p. 1508.
50Case 25/70 Köster, EU:C:1970:115.
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the Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon altered this, at least on paper, ruling out any
legislative discretion: if uniform conditions are required, the legislature must confer
an implementing power on the Commission.
Whether such a transfer would have to conform to Meroni thus depends on how
the transferred power is conceptualised and how Article 291(2) TFEU is read. Inter-
preting the latter broadly so that it catches the transferred power would mean that the
EU legislature allows national authorities to transfer powers which should have been
conferred on the Commission (or exceptionally the Council) in the first place. Hence
Meroni should apply, to prevent it from being circumvented. If the transferred power
is conceptualised as different from the power in Article 291(2) TFEU (for instance
because of a narrow reading of the latter), one could argue that powers are not dele-
gated (or conferred) downwards from the Commission (or legislature) to EU agencies
but upwards from the Member States. If this reasoning were to be upheld, the Meroni
doctrine would not apply since no conferral or delegation from an EU authority is at
issue.
Finding that Meroni would not apply of course would not mean that any kind of
powers could be delegated from a national authority to an EU agency. Should the
EU legislature wish to inscribe this mechanism in further legislative acts, care should
be taken that the institutional balance is not upset. This would mean, inter alia, that
the agency’s mandate as defined by the legislature should not de facto be amended
through a bilateral delegation agreement between the agency and a national authority.
Whether it is sufficient in this regard that the agency (Board) agrees itself with the
delegation (without an agreement from the Commission or legislature) then remains
doubtful.
6 Conclusion
In its Short-selling ruling the Court applied and interpreted the Meroni doctrine and
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU in such a way as to sanction current and future EU agen-
cification. The ruling gives a sound basis to the political institutions to grant further
powers to EU agencies, further constructing the EU’s integrated administration. This
is not to say that all legal questions surrounding the institutional phenomenon of
agencification have been resolved but the Court gave its judicial blessing and in prac-
tice agencification has always proceeded based on a political consensus between the
Commission, Council and Parliament. It is also because of this consensus that the
limits of the new Short-selling doctrine will not immediately be tested: testing these
limits would require a new qualitative leap in agencification which could probably
only come about when the EU is faced with a crisis similar to the financial- and euro-
crises. While the 2015–2016 migrant crisis has resulted in an upgrade of Frontex’
powers, its (remarkable) increase in powers falls short of being qualified as resulting
in an autonomous (from both the Member States and the EU institutions) operational
power. That said, legal questions in relation to (i) the precise nature of the discre-
tion which agencies can exercise, (ii) how the acts which they adopt relate to the
acts foreseen in Article 290 and 291 TFEU and (iii) which delegation regime applies
to direct upward delegations from a national authority to its EU counterpart, remain
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unresolved. These issues may end up before the Court but even if they do not, the po-
litical institutions would be well advised not to merely glance over them when these
present themselves during legislative negotiations.
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